The macaroon signature chain.
sig_0 = Vault.mac_at!(root_data(token), token.key_version, ctx)
sig_i = HMAC-SHA256(sig_{i-1}, "ashvault:macaroon:caveat:v1|" <> len64(caveat_i) <> caveat_i)
token.sig = sig_nsig_0 is computed by the vault under the scope's :mac key — inside OpenBao for
AshVault.Macs.OpenBaoTransit — and is itself bound to the scope, resource and
macaroon name through the vault's associated data. Every later link is computed
locally with AshVault.Macs.HmacSha256.hmac/2, keyed by the previous signature: a
holder can append a caveat (extend the chain) but cannot remove one, because that
would need the earlier signature, which the token does not carry.
Each link carries its own domain prefix and a 64-bit length frame, so a chain step can
never collide with the vault's ashvault:mac:v1| frame or with any other HMAC an
application computes, and a caveat boundary can never be re-split.
Comparison of the final signature is constant-time (:crypto.hash_equals/2).
Summary
Functions
Constant-time comparison of two signatures. false for anything not 32 bytes.
Fold caveats onto sig, in order.
The bytes the root signature covers: the prefix, envelope version, scope, key version and identity, each length-framed.
One link of the chain: the signature after appending caveat to sig.
Functions
Constant-time comparison of two signatures. false for anything not 32 bytes.
Fold caveats onto sig, in order.
@spec root_data(AshVault.Macaroon.Envelope.t()) :: binary()
The bytes the root signature covers: the prefix, envelope version, scope, key version and identity, each length-framed.
One link of the chain: the signature after appending caveat to sig.